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BANKRUPTCY & THE UNDERWATER 




Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code exists to satisfy the claims of 
creditors and preserve an economic “fresh start” for the debtor after 
bankruptcy. In exchange for surrendering her property to the trustee to have it 
monetized (i.e., sold), the debtor receives a discharge of her debts and an 
injunction against future creditor in personam actions to recover them. 
However, the in personam injunction is insufficient to protect consumer 
debtors who are in default on mortgages encumbering underwater homes 
because the creditor’s in rem rights remain; after the conclusion of the case, 
the creditor can continue foreclosure proceedings, which result in eviction and 
often homelessness. The economic, educational, and health externalities of 
foreclosure and homelessness are detrimental to individuals and harmful to 
society at large. The Bankruptcy Code already possesses the tool to prevent 
these harms without disadvantaging creditors—the right to redeem under 
§ 722—but currently restricts redemption to personal property. This Note 
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The home is the foundation of modern American society.  For renters and 
owners alike, where someone lives represents ties to history and community and 
determines access to social services.  For homeowners—representing around 
65% of all occupied housing in 20181—the home is also usually their primary 
asset.2 Psychologically, home ownership is a manifestation of the American 
Dream and provides a mechanism for families to achieve lasting economic se-
curity.3 Home ownership in one generation creates economic and educational 
benefits for subsequent generations through stability during child-rearing years 
and a future inheritance.4
Beyond the mere absence of positive effects, lack of adequate shelter threat-
ens life and health.5 Without an address, jobless and homeless individuals have 
difficulty finding and keeping employment, further contributing to poor health, 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2021. I would like to thank the 
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review for their effort and help throughout the publica-
tion process. I am similarly indebted to Professors Bagenstos and Pottow for their guidance and to 
Conor Bradley for his insight. Many thanks to my family, friends, and Tara for their continued sup-
port.
1. Jennifer Ruden, Homeownership rate in the United States from 1990 to 2018, STATISTA
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/184902/homeownership-rate-in-the-us-since-
2003/.
2. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evi-
dence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 Fed. Reserve Bulletin 1, 48 (2012) (available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf); see, e.g., Maniska Thakor, Five 
Expenses That Will Consume 50 Percent Of Your Lifetime Earnings, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2010/08/02/lifetime-earnings-home-car-children-
education-retirement/#7596b22b507d.
3. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Record of Achievement – Expanding Home Owner-
ship, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/achievement
/chap7.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) (describing the “American Dream Downpayment Act”); see 
also President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Responsible Homeownership,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/06/remarks-president-responsible-
homeownership (Aug. 8, 2013) (“[T]he most tangible cornerstone that lies at the heart of the Ameri-
can Dream, at the heart of middle-class life—and that’s the chance to own your own home. The 
chance to own your own home.”).
4. Heather Sandstrom & Sandra Huerta, The Negative Effects of Instability on Child Devel-
opment: A Research Synthesis, URBAN INSTITUTE, at 28 (Sept. 2013), https://www.urban.org
/sites/default/files/publication/32706/412899-The-Negative-Effects-of-Instability-on-Child-
Development-A-Research-Synthesis.PDF.
5. Health and Homelessness, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, https://www.apa.org
/pi/ses/resources/publications/homelessness-health (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); see also INST. OF
MED. (US) COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE (1988), HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH,
AND HUMAN NEEDS: HEALTH PROBLEMS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/books/NBK218236/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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economic, and educational outcomes for them and their families.6 Furthermore, 
when a homeowner falls behind on her mortgage payments, she and her family 
risk losing their home and the safety it provides.  Foreclosure proceedings result 
in eviction and its associated harms.7 When a home is worth less than the out-
standing mortgage, which frequently happens in economic downturns, 8 the 
debtor will end up with nothing, even after saving up for a down payment and 
making years of monthly payments.
Even though bankruptcy’s debt discharge is robust, the system fails to pro-
vide an adequate safety valve for debtors who are in default on their underwater 
homes.  By filing bankruptcy, these debtors get the nominal benefit of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code’s protections, including the automatic stay (which enjoins 
creditor activity to pursue collections or foreclosure) and the opportunity to pre-
vent creditors from seizing their assets.  However, due to statutory restrictions 
or structural impediments, these opportunities fail debtors in underwater homes.  
As a result, Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers—an average of 725,000 per year since 
2005, representing 68% of all consumer filings9—gain nothing but the automat-
ic stay’s temporary delay before eventual foreclosure and eviction.
This Note argues for a statutory change to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the 
“Code”) extending the right to redeem to real property.  Part I provides short 
histories of the U.S. bankruptcy system and redemption, both in equity and in 
modern statute.  Part II analyzes current bankruptcy law and explains how its 
shortcomings harm debtors.  Part III outlines the proposed change and the eco-
nomic and social benefits it confers on both debtors and creditors and also ad-
dresses potential counterarguments.
6. See, e.g., Getting a Job Without an Address, SUV LIVING (Aug. 18, 2012), 
http://aboutsuvliving.blogspot.com/2012/08/getting-job-without-address.html.
7. Leigh Thompson, What Happens After Foreclosure & the Property Is Sold?, SFGATE: 
HOME GUIDES (last visited Nov. 10, 2019), https://homeguides.sfgate.com/happens-after-
foreclosure-property-sold-55824.html; see also Amy Loftsgordon, Foreclosure Timeline: Getting 
Notice to Leave, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/foreclosure-book
/chapter9-5.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); Foreclosure and Eviction for Homeowners
MICH. LEGAL HELP, https://michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/housing/foreclosure-and-eviction-
homeowners.
8. See Michele Conlin & Robin Respaut, Millions of Americans still trapped in debt-logged 
homes ten years after crisis, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2018, 8:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-housing-underwater-insight/millions-of-americans-still-trapped-in-debt-logged-
homes-ten-years-after-crisis-idUSKCN1LU0EP; see also Andrea Riquier, Has the housing market 
recovered? Ask the 1.4 million homeowners still underwater, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 14, 2017, 
10:58 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/has-the-housing-market-recovered-ask-the-14-
million-underwater-homeowners-2017-12-13.
9. UNITED STATES COURTS, Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006-2017
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-facts-consumer-bankruptcy-filings-
2006-2017.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. A (Short) Overview of the Bankruptcy System
At the highest level of abstraction, the U.S. bankruptcy system exists to fa-
cilitate individual and business debt restructuring, rehabilitation, and liquida-
tion.  The system is broken down into six “chapters” to accommodate the prac-
tical needs of a diverse range of debtor attributes, goals, and sizes: 7 
(liquidations), 9 (municipal), 11 (reorganization for businesses and individuals 
with debts above a certain amount), 12 (family farmers and fishermen), 13 (in-
dividual reorganization), and 15 (international). Proceedings can be opened 
“voluntarily” (by the debtor) or “involuntarily” (by creditors under statutory 
guidance).  This distinction refers to how the case begins, not the debtor’s sub-
jective feelings; though someone filing for bankruptcy to stave off foreclosure 
or other creditor action may feel as though her back is against the wall, in bank-
ruptcy parlance her filing is voluntary.
Filing under any chapter of the Code does two key things: (1) creates the 
bankruptcy “estate” and (2) automatically stays a variety of creditor action 
against the debtor or property of the estate.  The bankruptcy estate is, in effect, a 
trust containing the debtor’s property which is held for the benefit of creditors.  
Notably, “property of the estate” does not simply follow state law property con-
cepts, but rather is its own term of art under federal bankruptcy law and can 
contain things of value not considered property under state law.10 However, not 
all debtor property enters the estate; the bankruptcy system allows property ex-
empted from seizure by judgment creditors under state or federal law to remain 
outside the estate and therefore unavailable for creditor repayment.11 Depend-
ing on whether the bankruptcy case is a liquidation or a reorganization, either a 
trustee or the debtor as “debtor-in-possession” administers the estate.  The au-
tomatic stay is an immediate injunction against creditor action to collect debts 
from a debtor who has declared bankruptcy or from property of the estate.  
While subject to exceptions, the automatic stay is powerful and broad.  It ap-
plies to all entities and a diverse array of potential behavior, including com-
mencement or continuance of a judicial proceeding against the debtor, enforce-
ment of a judgment against the debtor or property of the estate, any act to obtain 
possession or exercise control over property of the estate, any creation, perfec-
tion, or enforcement of a lien, and more.12 Further, the automatic stay has teeth; 
“willful” violations (those done deliberately and intentionally with knowledge 
10. See, e.g., In re Burgess, 234 B.R. 793, 799 (D. Nev. 1999) (finding a brothel license to 
be “property of the estate” although the license was not property under Nevada state law).
11. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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of the automatic stay) allow recovery for actual damages, costs, and attorneys’
fees, and, where appropriate, punitive damages.13
State law and the Code treat debt differently according to how they were in-
curred and whether the creditor has any property rights in specific collateral.  At 
a threshold level, creditors are either “secured” or “unsecured” based on their 
claim.  An entire body of law (secured transactions and Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code) dictates the creation, attachment, and perfection of security 
interests in property; relevant for this discussion is simply that in most cases, 
secured parties gain rights (a lien) in collateral through negotiation in the credit 
transaction.  The effect of becoming a secured party is that upon the debtor’s 
default, the creditor can repossess the collateral and sell it to recover or mitigate 
its loss.  A mortgage lender is the archetypical secured lender. When someone 
“mortgages” their house, they borrow money from a lender in exchange for a 
promise to repay (including interest) and a lien, which gives the lender the right 
to foreclose and sell the house upon default.  Automobile financers are another 
common example. In exchange for lending a debtor money to cover the pur-
chase price of the automobile, the lender receives the right to repossess and sell 
the car upon default.  Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, do not have a se-
curity interest in collateral.  Think of, for example, a tort victim, credit card 
company, or supplier.14 These kinds of creditors cannot simply repossess and 
sell property to cover their losses; instead, they must sue (either in tort or in 
contract for breach), receive a monetary judgment, record the judgment to form 
rights in property, and have the state (typically via a sheriff) seize the property 
and conduct a sale.  Secured status also means that when the collateral is sold, 
secured lenders are repaid first; unsecured creditors can only be paid out of the 
surplus, which reduces their likelihood for recovery.  These are some of the 
main reasons why mortgage interest rates are typically much lower than credit 
card interest rates.
When an individual consumer debtor voluntarily files for bankruptcy, she 
does so under a specific chapter depending on her attributes and goals.  For 
simplicity’s sake, this discussion will focus on chapters 7 and 13, as these two 
represent nearly all individual filings in the U.S. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, all 
of a debtor’s non-exempt property comprises the estate, which she surrenders to 
a court appointed trustee in exchange for a discharge of her debts and an injunc-
tion against future collections efforts by creditors.  The trustee then sells the as-
sets and distributes the proceeds among the creditors depending on their statuto-
rily defined priority.  Consumer Chapter 7 cases typically take a few months 
13. Id. § 362(h); see, e.g., In re Green, 2011 WL 5902502, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 
20, 2011) (finding that routine collections letters sent after the debtor notified one department of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition by a different department with no knowledge of the petition consti-
tuted a violation of the automatic stay).
14. In certain limited circumstances sellers of goods retain security interests in property un-
der Article 9; for the purpose of this introductory discussion, these suppliers are treated as unse-
cured creditors.
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and creditors usually receive a small fraction of the amount they are owed.  In 
contrast, Chapter 13 is known as the “wage-earner’s plan,” where a debtor with 
regular income fashions a three- or five-year plan (under the court’s supervi-
sion) to keep their assets and repay existing creditors with future earnings.15
Here, the debtor keeps her property throughout the plan and only receives the 
discharge upon the plan’s successful completion.  In order for a plan to be ap-
proved by the court, creditors must be projected to receive at least as much as 
they would in a hypothetical liquidation, including interest to represent the val-
ue (rather than the amount) of their claim.16
The statutory provision at issue in this Note applies in Chapter 7.  Chapter 7 
debtors must state what they plan to do with property that is encumbered by a 
lien (i.e., property that is not exempt from seizure by unsecured creditors or that 
the debtor voluntarily pledged as collateral).  There are three formal (and one 
informal) options available to the debtor: redemption, which this Note focuses 
on; reaffirmation; surrender; and ride-through.  The strengths and weaknesses of 
these options are discussed in depth in Part II(b).
The moral and policy considerations that undergird the bankruptcy system 
have deep roots. Tracing back to biblical Jubilees and beyond, debt forgiveness 
is engrained in the Judeo-Christian value system that the American Founders 
saw themselves codifying in the Constitution.17 New beginnings have remained 
deeply connected with the American psyche; from homestead acts to “streets 
paved with gold,” domestic policy has long embodied commitment to economic 
and social rebirth.18 Bankruptcy law is no exception to this phenomenon.  By 
preserving the debtor’s fresh start after bankruptcy, proponents argue, the bank-
ruptcy system provides an important rehabilitative function to those who need it 
the most.19
Even more, debtor rehabilitation has positive externalities; a system that 
leaves bankrupt debtors destitute strains welfare services and hamstrings socie-
ty.  As one scholar puts it, “society as a whole also loses when moping bankrupt 
debtors are distracted from working at their highest and best use level of 
productivity because they are instead coping with financial ruin.”20 The bank-
15. See Steve Nitz, The Different Chapters of Bankruptcy Explained, NFCC (Sept. 22, 
2017), https://www.nfcc.org/resources/blog/different-chapters-bankruptcy-explained/.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).
17. Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act-Its Effect Upon the Law of Bankruptcy, 9 
FORDHAM L. REV. 380, 380–81 (1940) (discussing history of bankruptcy, debt relief, and passage of 
Constitution).
18. Streets Paved With Gold, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/elis/learn/education
/streets-paved-with-gold.htm (“For generations, our ancestors came to this nation filled with endless 
hopes and dreams. The rumor that American streets were “paved with gold” created anticipation and 
excitement in the hearts of those seeking a better life.”).
19. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
1047, 1088 (1987).
20. John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 
412 (2007).
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ruptcy system implements its “fresh start” goal by exempting certain of the 
debtor’s property from seizure by unsecured creditors and making invalid non-
possessory, non-purchase money security interests in heirlooms, clothing, furni-
ture, tools of the trade, and health aids.21 In short, there are some things that are 
off-limits to creditors, either because of dignitary or leverage concerns (i.e. the 
creditor cannot seize clothing or heirlooms to satisfy debt or bully the debtor) or 
to preserve rehabilitative prospects (automobile equity, tools of the trade, etc.).
On the other hand, there is an equally deep tradition in paying back debts.  
Filing for bankruptcy has powerful moral implications.  Taking on debt is fun-
damentally a promise to repay money—an important legal and moral promise—
that should be given solemn weight.  Filing bankruptcy is a decision to repudi-
ate these promises made in exchange for goods, services, and other promises.22
These promises are not empty or symbolic; “[o]f such promises and reciprocity 
is the fabric of civil society woven.”23 From a structural economic perspective, 
debt repayment facilitates cheap credit availability and trust in the financial sys-
tem as loans are repaid.  The easier it is for a debtor to renege on their obliga-
tions, the thinking goes, the more likely a marginal debtor is to take advantage 
of the system and shirk debts they otherwise have the financial capacity to 
pay.24 Extending the scenario to its logical outcome, lenders will be less certain 
of repayment and will in fact have fewer loans repaid to completion, reducing
the amount of available credit and raising the cost of credit for those that can get 
it.  In this line of thought, debt erasure is not an unqualified moral or economic 
good as it imposes costs on other system participants and represents broken 
commitments.25
B. History of the U.S. Bankruptcy System
The U.S. Constitution provides for federal bankruptcy law and courts in Ar-
ticle I. 26 However, excepting some short periods in the early- and mid-
nineteenth century where legislation was enacted and repealed (often within the 
21. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 361 (1977).
22. Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 
181 (1999).
23. Id.
24. See President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of [BAPCPA] (April 20, 2005) 
(transcript available in the White House Archives) (“[T]oo many people have abused the bankruptcy 
laws. They’ve walked away from debts even when they had the ability to repay them.”).
25. The true culprit, though, is not debt erasure specifically but rather nonpayment generally. 
To a lender, there is little economic difference between formal discharge and the simple inability to 
draw blood from a stone; either way, the lender bears a loss. This suggests that redemption of un-
derwater homes does not impose additional costs on lenders (or other market participants) as the 
redemption payment replaces the sale of the foreclosed home to recoup losses (as discussed below 
in Part III(b)(i)).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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same decade), there was no federal bankruptcy law in the United States.27 In 
fact, perhaps due to ebbs and flows of political pressure, no uniform bankruptcy 
law had any staying power until the very end of the nineteenth century.28 When 
these systems were in effect, though, they were notably creditor-friendly, 
providing for such punitive measures as civil confinement in debtor’s prisons 
for failure to repay debts.29 In 1898, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act and 
enacted the first modern federal bankruptcy law.30 This new regime was mean-
ingfully different from its predecessors in several ways, establishing both the 
“referee” position to oversee administration of cases and the office of the trus-
tee, as well as providing for the reorganization (rather than liquidation) of cor-
porations.31 Even so, the federal bankruptcy law had problems, leading to sev-
eral amendments over the next half-century.32
In this context, Congress overhauled the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in 1978 and 
created the modern Bankruptcy Code and court system with the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act (the “Act”).33 In adopting the new Code, Congress aimed to balance 
the economic “fresh start” and productive rehabilitation of the debtor with the 
rights of creditors.34 In addition to effecting structural changes to the court sys-
tem and endowing bankruptcy judges with substantial power, the Act was nota-
bly debtor friendly.  Among other changes, the new Code included an expansive 
list of exemptions which exceeded previously available allotments, protected 
those exemptions from judicial liens, expanded the types of debts that could be 
discharged, and introduced the right to redeem personal property in Chapter 7.35
While the direct effects of these changes on consumer filings are disputed in 
27. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 
(1999) (“[T]he standard story of American bankruptcy history is a tale of bust and boom. On this 
view, we have the Depression of 1793 to thank for the 1800 Bankruptcy Act; and the Panics of 
1837, 1857, and 1893 to thank for the 1841, 1867, and 1898 Acts. Once the first three acts had done 
their initial work and economic conditions improved, Congress repealed the federal legislation and 
left insolvency law to the states.”).
28. Id. at 322 (“Under ordinary circumstances, there was not enough political support to 
keep a permanent bankruptcy law in place. But the nation was periodically thrown into turmoil by 
deep economic depressions. These depressions provoked loud cries for bankruptcy legislation. Con-
gress responded to this pressure by passing bankruptcy laws, but it then repealed the laws when the 
depression passed and support for federal bankruptcy regulation receded.”).
29. Debtors’ Prison Relief Act of 1792, Ch. 29, 1 Stat. 265; Debt Imprisonment Abolishment 
Act of 1839, Ch. 35, 5 Stat. 321; see 28 U.S.C. § 2007.
30. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
31. The Evolution of U.S. Bankruptcy Law: A Time Line, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/docs/the_evelution_of_bankruptcy_law.pdf; Bradley Han-
son, Bankruptcy Law in the United States, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/bankruptcy-law-in-the-united-
states/.
32. Leibell, supra note 17, at 385–86.
33. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549.
34. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND 
FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 91 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
35. Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J. L. & ECON. 803, 807–08 (1993).
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light of changing economic conditions, between 1980 and 2004, consumer 
bankruptcy filings grew at an average rate of 7.6% per year.36 As of 2005, the 
filing rate was 5.4 per 1,000 people, more than four times the 1980 rate and 
nearly 80 times the 1920 rate.37
Determining (perhaps incorrectly) that consumers were “abusing” the sys-
tem and filing bankruptcy too easily, Congress substantially amended the Code 
in 2005 with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA).38 BAPCPA came down hard on consumer filers by 
curtailing a debtor’s flexibility in choosing under which chapter of bankruptcy 
to file and removing key debtor-friendly attributes of the system.  Specifically, 
BAPCPA introduced the “means test” to push more debtors into Chapter 13, 
reduced the scope of the Chapter 13 “super discharge,” and mandated that con-
sumer filers receive credit counseling and financial management training before
filing.39 While scholars debate the effect of these changes on filing behavior 
considering macroeconomic forces, normative sentiment against “being a bank-
36. Thomas A. Garrett, The Rise in Personal Bankruptcies: The Eighth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict and Beyond, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. (2007), https://files.stlouisfed.org
/files/htdocs/publications/review/07/01/Garrett.pdf [hereinafter Rise in Personal Bankruptcies] (ex-
amining potential explanations for the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings); Thomas A. Garrett &
Lesli S. Ott, Up, Up and Away: Personal Bankruptcies Soar! REGIONAL ECONOMIST, at 10, 11 (Oct. 
2005), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2005/up-up-and-away-
personal-bankruptcies-soar [hereinafter Up, Up and Away].
37. Rise in Personal Bankruptcies, supra note 36, at 15; Up, Up and Away, supra note 36.
38. Pub. L. No. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C.).
39. The “means test” is a rigid process which requires the bankruptcy court to presume 
abuse for certain Chapter 7 filings, which results in either their dismissal or conversion to Chapter 
13. First, the means test requires calculating a debtor’s “current monthly income” (actually, a six-
month retrospective calculation) and comparing it to the median income in the debtor’s region. If 
the debtor is below-median, she may proceed to Chapter 7. If she is above-median, the means test 
proscribes a budget to apply to the debtor’s expenses based on her region and family size, but with-
out consideration of her actual assets, liabilities, family situation, or need. For example, the means 
test may assume that a debtor spends $50.00 per month for gasoline or transportation expenses. That 
determination applies both to a debtor who walks to work and one who must commute an hour by 
car. After applying the budget to the debtor’s expenses, the court calculates a debtor’s “disposable 
income”—namely, any income beyond those statutorily allocated amounts. Because Chapter 13 
plans require that all of a debtor’s disposable income be used to repay creditors if it exceeds a cer-
tain dollar amount per month (on paper), any gap between a debtor’s actual expenses and the statu-
tory count hurts her. The debtor who walks to work and spends less than $50.00 per month on 
transportation cannot reallocate the “saved” money in the budget to an item on which she exceeds 
the statutory cap, like her food expense. As a result, the money spent on food above the statutory 
count will be considered disposable income, regardless of its necessity. Similarly, the debtor who 
exceeds $50.00 per month in transportation costs receives no flexibility; the money she spends 
commuting above the $50.00 threshold will be considered disposable income. As of publication, 
those who end up with a monthly disposable income above $166.67 are deemed ineligible for Chap-
ter 7. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 253–80 (Wolters 
Kluwer, 7th ed. 2014); 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2), 109(h), 1325(b); William D. Weber, Chapter 13 
“Super” Discharge Shrinks, WEBER LAW FIRM, P.C., https://weberlaw.com/bankruptcy-reform-
index/chapter-13-super-discharge-shrinks/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
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rupt,” and recognition that most filings follow a traumatic financial event (job 
loss, marital status change, or medical bills),40 BAPCPA’s passage coincided 
with a sharp drop in consumer filings.41
C. The Equity of Redemption and the Statutory Right to Redeem
The principle behind redemption (one of the Chapter 7 debtor’s three op-
tions for encumbered property) dates back to the English Courts of Equity.42
Before the modern statutory scheme governing security interests developed, 
land owners who wanted to grant a mortgage on their property executed a con-
veyance of legal title to the lender as security for the loan.43 Upon successful 
repayment of the loan, the mortgagor (land owner) could petition the courts to 
compel the mortgagee to transfer the property back to the mortgagor.44 But if 
the mortgagor was unsuccessful in repaying the loan, the land vested in the 
lender and the mortgagor’s claim to title was terminated.45 Because the mort-
gage debt was typically lower than the value of the property, usurious lenders 
would dispossess debtors upon simple defaults, resulting in windfalls.46 To il-
lustrate, imagine you own a farm worth $10,000, encumbered by a $8,000 
mortgage.  One month, you are a few days late paying because you forgot, or 
you committed another simple default.  Because the mortgagee holds title to the 
land, your default would vest ownership of the $10,000 farm to the lender, even 
though you had only borrowed $8,000.  The equity of redemption allowed debt-
ors to combat forfeiture upon simple default by bringing past payments up to 
date.47 To prevent the debtor’s continued possession of the land during a true 
default, the lender could foreclose the debtor’s right of redemption through a 
judicial process, fully extinguishing the debtor’s claims to the land.48 Upon 
40. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results 
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741–46 (2009), https://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-
9343(09)00404-5/fulltext; see generally WARREN ET AL., supra note 38, at 305–22.
41. WARREN ET AL., supra note 39, at 321.
42. Thomas W. Bigley, Property Law—The Equity of Redemption: Who Decides When it 
Ends?, 21 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 317 n.11 (1995) (“Equitable redemption rights arose 
from English Courts of Equity and reflect the court’s desire to balance power between the mortgag-
or and mortgagee.”).
43. Id. at 318–19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 319–20.
47. Id.; see also id. at 319 n.19 (‘“After Edward the First, the English Courts of Equity in-
troduced equitable redemption to weaken the mortgagee’s usurious control over the debtor.’ This 
balancing of power between the mortgagee and the debtor gave the debtor the ability to redeem his 
property despite a payment default.”).
48. Id. at 320–21. Extinguishing the debtor’s claims to the land allowed the creditor to sell 
the land with a clean (uncontested) title to recoup its losses.
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foreclosure, the debtor could no longer petition the court for the equity of re-
demption.49 These are the origins of today’s vocabulary.
In the modern context, statutes prescribe how security interests are formed, 
granted, and managed.  As a result, the traditional equity of redemption mor-
phed as states codified versions of it into their property law.50 The statutory 
right to redeem differs from the equity of redemption in several respects, but the 
two most important are: (1) it can provide an opportunity for a debtor to redeem 
the property after foreclosure, and (2) the debtor can only redeem by paying the 
full amount of the debt (or sometimes the foreclosure sale price), not just by 
curing the arrearage.51 These attributes afford the debtor more time to save her 
home (statutory rights to redeem can, in some states, be exercised up to a year 
after the foreclosure sale) and can avoid forfeiture of the debtor’s equity due to 
the severe market imperfections surrounding foreclosure sales, which artificially 
deflate home values.52 Today, roughly half of the states have statutory rights to 
redeem on the books.53
II. THE LAW TODAY
Part II begins by explaining how residential homes are treated under the 
Bankruptcy Code, describing how state and federal exemptions prevent certain 
lien creditors (e.g., a successful tort plaintiff) from seizing and selling particular 
property to satisfy their debt.  These protections, however, do not enjoin mort-
gagees, as the debtor voluntarily granted the lien.  Part II(b) discusses the four 
options a Chapter 7 debtor has to address debts secured by property—
redemption, reaffirmation, surrender, and ride through—and why each fails to 
protect underwater homeowners.
A. Homesteads Under the Bankruptcy Code
Every state exempts certain property from involuntary seizure by creditors, 
but the breadth and depth of the exemption varies from state to state.  This 
means that judgment lien creditors cannot look to certain property for repay-
ment by the debtor.  However, a debtor can waive the exemption by granting a
voluntary security interest in otherwise exempt property.54 While every state 
exempts homesteads (primary residential homes) to some extent from seizure 
by judgment creditors, this exemption does not prevent foreclosure and sale by 
49. Id. at 318.
50. See id.
51. U.C.C. § 9-623 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); AllLaw, The Right of 
Redemption, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/foreclosure/right-of-redemption.html.
52. See generally Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 93-1, 1993).
53. AllLaw, supra note 51.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2020).
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the mortgage lender. The Code incorporates state law exemptions and provides 
an alternate set of exemptions in § 522 that the debtor can sometimes elect in 
lieu of their state law rights.55 However, these laws only determine what kinds 
of property can be seized and sold by a judicial creditor—because a homeowner 
grants a voluntary mortgage to the lender, these rules do not apply.56
As a result, a debtor who is underwater on her mortgage receives little pro-
tection from a foreclosing lender under state or federal exemptions.  Chapter 7’s
debt discharge only prohibits in personam actions against the debtor to collect 
the defaulted debt; the lien and in rem rights survive.  Bankruptcy’s automatic 
stay pauses a foreclosure but nothing stops the mortgage lender from continuing 
the in rem process after case resolution because the lender’s rights to repossess 
the collateral survive.  After bankruptcy, an underwater homeowner cannot be 
sued and made to pay the full amount of the mortgage but also cannot prevent 
the lender from repossessing and selling her home.  Bankruptcy for this debtor 
only provides a delay of the inevitable.
B. Redemption, Reaffirmation, Surrender, and Ride Through
When a debtor files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she must file a Statement of 
Intent with respect to all debts secured by property within thirty days of the first 
mandatory meeting with creditors. 57 This form provides three options: the 
debtor can surrender the property to the creditor in full satisfaction of the debt, 
reaffirm the debt and waive the discharge of the debt, or redeem the property 
and keep the collateral by paying the lower of the balance of the loan or the val-
ue of the collateral.58 With the creditor’s cooperation, the debtor can also in-
formally “ride through” a debt by continuing to make scheduled payments and 
perform the pre-bankruptcy contract.59
Each of these options fails the Chapter 7 debtor looking to save her home.  
Surrender is precisely the opposite outcome that many debtors desire.  Reaffir-
mation nominally provides the debtor an opportunity to negotiate with her lend-
er to reduce monthly payments, extend payment timelines, or even reduce the 
balance of the debt.  In practice, however, reaffirmation is rarely so debtor 
friendly.  Knowing that the debtor will emerge from bankruptcy with reduced 
overall debt service (due to her other debts being discharged), the lender has lit-
tle incentive to make accommodations in negotiations.  In fact, the lender has 
the leverage (threat of repossession) to demand new concessions in the reaf-
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2020).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2020).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2020).
58. Id.; id. § 722.
59. Samuel J. Turco, Jr., Riding Through the Chapter 7 Backdoor: A Story of Car Loans in 
Bankruptcy, NEB. DEBT & BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.nebraskadebt
bankruptcyblog.com/2016/08/riding-through-the-chapter-7-backdoor-a-story-of-car-loans-in-
bankruptcy/.
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firmed agreement, tacking on otherwise non-collectable attorney’s and other 
fees.60 Reaffirmation also includes procedural hurdles, such as court approval 
and heightened disclosure requirements.61 The Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws in the United States (the “Commission”), formed in the early 1970s to re-
port on U.S. bankruptcy law in anticipation of legislative change, recognized 
reaffirmation’s key deficiency in its reform recommendations to the House of 
Representatives: because collateral is often lower in value than the debt, the dis-
charge relieving the debtor from the unsecured portion of the debt is “neutral-
ized” by the secured creditor’s ability to obtain reaffirmation of the entire debt 
under threat of repossession.62
Ride through is similarly unavailable to these debtors because of the home’s 
importance. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs63 is proven out by a debtor with her 
back against the wall; debtors prioritize mortgage payments over certain other 
consumer debt, like credit cards, precisely because mortgage lenders have the 
ability to foreclose.64 As a result, failure to pay the mortgage is not simply a 
question of resource prioritization but rather a recognition of insufficient re-
sources.  A debtor trying to save her home from foreclosure has already default-
ed and the bank has lost confidence in the prospect of repayment.
On paper, though, redemption offers clear value to a rehabilitating debtor by 
empowering her to unilaterally reduce her debt payment on an asset.  Beginning 
with the adoption of the Code in 1978, Congress intended that this “new” § 722 
be “broader” than the rights of redemption under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, authorizing “an individual debtor to redeem tangible personal property 
intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a 
nonpurchase money dischargeable consumer debt.”65 The Commission recom-
mended to the House of Representatives that a consumer debtor be allowed to 
redeem collateral securing a dischargeable consumer debt by paying the lesser 
of the claim or the appraised value.  This change would “result in the secured 
creditor’s realizing what he is entitled to, but it will avoid the improper leverage 
a secured creditor now enjoys by being able to deprive the debtor of his proper-
ty unless payment is made.”66 The House adopted the right to redeem in part 
60. See, e.g., In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120, 124–25 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (explaining 
that the reaffirmation process does not prohibit lenders from negotiating a provision for the payment 
of attorney’s fees).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (k) (2020).
62. FRANK R. KENNEDY, COMM’N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 10 
(1973).
63. See A. H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943).
64. Jacob Conway & Matthew Plosser, When Debts Compete, Which Wins?, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST ECON. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org
/2017/03/when-debts-compete-which-wins.html.
65. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 95 (1978).
66. Letter of Submittal from Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Pub. 
L. No. 95-598 (1973).
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due to the failures of existing state exemption laws to protect debtors from a se-
cured creditor’s foreclosure action after discharge.  Discussing the Commis-
sion’s recommendation, the House recognized the shortcomings of exemptions 
without a concomitant method to remove the secured creditor’s lien:
it does little good to allow the debtor an exemption of wearing apparel, household 
goods, or health aids subject to an indefeasible security interest . . . if the debtor 
must pay more than the property is worth for the privilege of continuing to use the 
property. The fair market value of such property is often substantially less than the 
amount owed and little anything can be realized upon forced disposition of the 
property. What the creditor really has is leverage to force payment under the pre-
sent act, since continued use is conditioned on forebearance [sic] by the creditor 
and forebearance [sic] is exacted at a high price.
67
The right to redeem solved this problem by allowing a debtor to redeem 
“property that would be exempt in the absence of the security interest” upon 
payment of the amount of the allowed secured claim.68 As a result, the right to 
redeem furthers the key policy goal of debtor rehabilitation by allowing her to 
“retain [her] necessary property and avoid high replacement costs” while still 
allowing the creditor to obtain “what [she] is entitled to under the terms of [her] 
contract.”69
A niche finance industry exists to provide bankrupt debtors the lump sum
required to redeem their property.70 While traditional lenders perceive bankrupt 
debtors as financially irresponsible—an assumption undercut by the fact that 
62% of consumer filers file bankruptcy as a result of discrete financial trau-
ma71—redemption financers recognize that these debtors, after the bankruptcy 
discharge, will have few liabilities.72 Instead of trying to balance unmanageable 
debt service, the newly-discharged debtor is a blank slate.  Even more, the debt 
associated with the redeemed asset has been accordingly reduced to reflect its 
true value.  The debtor is no longer making too-large monthly car loan pay-
ments on a rapidly depreciating vehicle, but rather payments in line with the 
car’s then-current value.73 Though interest rates will likely be higher, the re-
duction in the principal amount of the loan (reflecting the decrease in collateral 
value) means that the debtor’s monthly payments will go down.  That reduction 
67. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 128 (1977).
68. Id. at 127.
69. Id.
70. Without outside intervention, redemption is effectively unavailable to bankrupt debtors 
because they must pay off the lender in a lump sum and bankrupt debtors do not typically have piles 
of cash sitting around. Redemption financers operate in this gap, lending the redemption payment to 
bankrupt debtors.
71. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 40.
72. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 87 (2006) (showing that creditors aggressively market to debtors who recently 
filed for bankruptcy).
73. See Redemption Program, 722 REDEMPTION FUNDING, INC., https://www.722
redemption.com/debtor/redemptionprogram/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
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of, for example, $300 per month means a world of difference to a debtor in fi-
nancial distress.  Perhaps it even means the difference between insolvency and 
solvency.
Unfortunately, the benefits of redemption do not accrue to homeowners be-
cause of the statute’s restrictive language.74 The Code allows debtors to redeem 
and keep personal property (e.g., a car) by paying off the lesser of the value of 
the collateral or the outstanding debt, but the Code does not extend this protec-
tion to real property.75 For a debtor looking to save her underwater home, this 
opportunity to reduce her debt payments to accord with the property’s value is 
not even an option.
So why is redemption expressly limited to “tangible personal property in-
tended primarily for personal, family, or household use?” This restriction de-
veloped, as mentioned above, because of the failures of the law to protect ex-
emptible assets from post-bankruptcy foreclosure action.  Congress’ recognition 
that the right to redeem was a “very substantial change” from then-current law 
informed their decision to restrict its applicability only to situations where the 
secured creditor may have “improper leverage” over exemptible property. 76
While Congress chose not to extend this lifeline to all the debtor’s property, 
perhaps Congress viewed foreclosure as “proper” leverage or had an idiosyn-
cratic desire to help debtors save their cars from repossession. Perhaps Con-
gress was concerned about debtor opportunism in cyclical markets; while most 
debtors’ redeemable personal property steadily depreciates over time, real es-
tate’s value is more cyclical.  This concern is discussed in depth in Part III(c).
III. EXTEND REDEMPTION TO REAL PROPERTY IN CHAPTER 7
Part III(a) begins by outlining the proposed statutory change and presents a
new, revised § 722. The section continues with a discussion of how the new 
§ 722 seamlessly interacts with other aspects of bankruptcy law and avoids po-
tential abusive opportunism.  Part III(b) outlines the rationales in support of the 
proposed change, including the economic benefits to creditors and the econom-
ic, health, educational, and social benefits to debtors and society.  Part III(c) ad-
dresses counterarguments regarding opportunistic debtors, political opposition 
to debtor-friendly legislative changes, judicial implementation, and market de-
velopment.
A. The Change
This Note proposes a simple change to § 722 of the Code: eliminate the 
provision’s qualification that redeemable property be “personal.” Section 722 
currently reads:
74. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
75. Id.
76. S REP. NO. 95-989, at 95 (1978).
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An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem 
under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer 
debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title or has been aban-
doned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount 
of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at 
the time of redemption.
77
The revised statute reads:
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem 
under this section, redeem tangible personal or real property intended primarily for 
personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer 
debt, if such personal property is exempted under section 522 of this title or such 
real property is exempted under section 522(d)(1), or such property has been aban-
doned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount 
of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at 
the time of redemption.
The proposed reform to § 722 permits debtors to redeem real property if it 
meets two primary conditions: (1) it must be intended primarily for personal, 
family, or household use, and (2) it must be exempted under § 522(d)(1) (the 
Code’s exemption for interests in real property used as a residence).78 A debt-
or’s underwater home meets these requirements—a family/personal dwelling 
satisfies the first requirement and its use as a residence satisfies the second.
This change extends the right to redeem to real property without overexpan-
sion and remains consistent with state and federal policy.  Importantly, the re-
quirement that the property be exempt under § 522(d)(1) prevents overexpan-
sion.  First, non-exempt property under the Code (or applicable state law) will 
remain unredeemable.  Second, by restricting real property redemption’s availa-
bility to § 522(d)(1), opportunistic filers cannot take advantage of the “wild 
card” exemption in (d)(5).  Without restriction to (d)(1), a debtor could take ad-
vantage of the system by using the (d)(5) wild card exemption for “any proper-
ty” on, for example, a vacation home.  Because the property is “exempted under 
section 522,” it would then be redeemable.  Since the aim of this statutory 
change is to prevent the harms of foreclosure and homelessness, the change re-
stricts itself to redeeming primary residences.  Third, because homesteads are at 
least partially exempt under the Code and all state law, they would become eli-
gible for redemption under the new § 722.  This change is thus limited to the 
kinds of property that Congress and the states have deemed uniquely worthy of 
protection, precluding this change from thwarting expressed federal or state pol-
icy.  Because no state permits exemptions for other kinds of real property and 
the Code only provides an exemption for real property used as a residence, the 
expansion of § 722 will be limited to protecting homesteads.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
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B. Rationales in Support
Extending the redemption right to real property confers economic benefits 
on all parties and furthers the normative and policy undercurrents supporting the 
bankruptcy system.  As an economic matter, this change maximizes value for 
debtors and creditors by reducing expensive transaction costs and resolving cas-
es more quickly.  Importantly, allowing homestead redemption does not come at 
the creditor’s expense, as it vindicates the Code’s objective that a secured lender 
in Chapter 7 be paid the full value of its allowed secured claim.79 The change 
also saves the debtor and her family from the negative economic and social ex-
ternalities of foreclosure-induced homelessness, which furthers the bankruptcy 
system’s desire to provide debtors a “fresh start.”80 These benefits accelerate 
the debtor on her path to financial rehabilitation while ensuring that she does 
not receive a free pass, as she will continue to pay off her home after leaving 
bankruptcy.
1. Economic Benefits for the Creditor
Under current law, filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy is at best an inconvenience 
to a foreclosing creditor and at worst value destructive.  Because the exempt 
status of the home does not apply to voluntarily granted security interests, the 
bankruptcy process does not substantively affect the relative rights of the de-
faulted debtor and the creditor.  While filing a bankruptcy petition affords the 
debtor the benefit of the automatic stay, which pauses the foreclosure action, 
that reprieve is only temporary.  Where the debt is greater than the value of the 
home, the trustee will “abandon” the property (removing it from the estate and 
the protection of the automatic stay) and allow the lender to continue the fore-
closure process.81
However, just because a delay is temporary does not mean it is cheap.  
Foreclosure destroys value because it exists in a disjointed and inefficient mar-
ket.  First, the foreclosure process takes a long time.82 Upon initiating a fore-
79. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
80. See supra Part I(a).
81. Kathleen Michon, When Will the Trustee Abandon Property in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy?,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/trustee-abandon-property-chapter-7-bankruptcy
.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
82. There are two kinds of foreclosure proceedings in the United States: judicial and nonju-
dicial. All states allow judicial foreclosure, where the creditor sues and obtains a judgment. Delays 
between initiation of judicial foreclosure and the eventual sale of the property can take months or 
even years. See, e.g., Amy Loftsgarden, States With Long Foreclosure Timelines, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/states-with-long-foreclosure-timelines.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2020) (stating that the fastest states having average foreclosure timelines between 6–9 
months and the “longest” timelines as up to 4 years). Many states, but not all, permit nonjudicial 
foreclosure through contract, where the lender initiates foreclosure by sending a notice to the bor-
rower. While faster than judicial foreclosure, nonjudicial foreclosure is far from automatic as statu-
tory restrictions delay the initiation of proceedings for 120 days after default and anti-eviction laws 
protect residents even after foreclosure sale. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)–(2), (g); CFPB, 2013 REAL 
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closure process, statutory guardrails protect debtors from immediate eviction.83
These delays can take months, generating additional carrying costs (including 
property taxes and maintenance) that the lender will have to bear or try to re-
coup in an eventual sale.84 Though foreclosure sales must be publicized, those 
advertisements need not and often do not portray a property in its most attrac-
tive light.85
When the foreclosure auction finally occurs, structural forces guarantee an 
inefficient outcome.  Requirements that non-creditor bidders bring cash or a 
cashier’s check to the auction disincentivize third party participation while stat-
utory rights permitting the creditor to “credit bid” the value of their debt before 
committing cash provide an engrained advantage to the foreclosing lender.86
For an underwater home, the outstanding debt is greater than the home’s value, 
thereby higher than what any rational third party would pay.  Even where state 
law permits deficiency judgments 87 after mortgage foreclosure sales, lenders 
will still take full advantage of their credit-bidding limit because foreclosed-
against debtors are likely to be judgment proof (or at least not worth the cost of 
suit).  Lack of property-level information exacerbates these advantages because 
potential bidders do not know the condition of the house.  Even if bidding ap-
pears to be a good investment on paper, hidden property damage or deferred 
maintenance loom.88 And if the debtor wants to exercise her state law right of 
ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
(REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING FINAL RULES 98 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov
/f/201311_cfpb_servicing-implementation-guide.pdf.
83. Id. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.41(f)(1)–(2), (g); CFPB, supra note 83, at 98–99 (discussing time-
lines for the foreclosure process); see, e.g., MICHIGAN LEGAL HELP, supra note 7 (stating that in 
Michigan, after foreclosure sale, the six-month redemption period must lapse before a homeowner 
can be evicted from the property).
84. See Tony Guerra, Do I Pay Property Taxes on My Foreclosed House?, SFGATE, 
https://homeguides.sfgate.com/pay-property-taxes-foreclosed-house-45525.html (last updated June 
23, 2018).
85. See generally State of Mich., Home Foreclosure, REINVENTING MI RETIREMENT: TOOLS
AND RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE FINANCIAL SECURITY, https://www.michigan.gov/documents
/reinventretirement/Home_Foreclosure_469522_7.pdf (noting that publication is just address, fore-
closure sale, and time in a qualifying periodical).
86. Amy Loftsgarden, What’s a Credit Bid in a Foreclosure?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com
/legal-encyclopedia/what-s-a-credit-bid-in-a-foreclosure.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
87. A deficiency judgment allows a creditor to sue the debtor for the difference (“deficien-
cy”) between the amount of the outstanding debt and the amount realized through sale. The ability 
to recover a deficiency provides an incentive against overbidding; where a mortgage is $200,000 
and the house is worth $160,000, a lender’s $200,000 credit bid extinguishes the possibility of a 
recovery above the value of the home, while a $160,000 bid preserves the possibility of collecting 
some of the remaining $40,000. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 580b(3) (West 2015).
88. Studies suggest that properties sold in foreclosure sales lose value that they would not 
have if they had been traded in another circumstance, perhaps due to foregone maintenance and up-
grades. Michael K. Hollar, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Emergency Homeowners’ Loan Program,
13 CITYSCAPE 185, 188 (2011); see also Asia Simone Burns, Woman Charged After 11 dead ani-
mals Found in Foreclosed Lawrenceville Home, ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 24, 2019), 
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redemption, she must pay off the full debt, an amount that is greater than the 
value of the home and inclusive of the accrued costs and fees.89
As a result, most foreclosure auctions end with the mortgage lender credit 
bidding the amount of the debt and winning the home at auction.  The lender 
then must sell the house, either directly to an end buyer by sprucing it up and 
hiring a realtor (incurring additional costs) or to an intermediary.  This process 
is expensive; real estate brokers typically charge sellers up to 6% of the sale 
price, legal fees suck up another 2% of the loan balance, the lender is responsi-
ble for property taxes in the interim, and the lender loses the time value of its 
money.90 In 2011, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
estimated these transaction costs (dead weight losses not attributable to a drop 
in home value) on a ~$150,000 outstanding principal balance to be just over 
$10,000, or nearly 7% of the outstanding balance.91 At the end of this head-
ache, the lender will sell the home for its value (the allowed secured claim!), all 
the while incurring costs, and the debtor will end up evicted.
The proposed change provides an opportunity to short-circuit this process 
and cash out the secured lender’s allowed secured claim for the price it will 
fetch after foreclosure, auction, and resale, without actually incurring those 
transaction costs.  Upon the Chapter 7 petition, the automatic stay pauses any 
ongoing foreclosure proceedings.92 The stay is powerful, affording the debtor 
the opportunity to redeem the property by paying the value of the home, not the 
greater debt amount.  This difference is dramatic.  Recalibrating the debt to ac-
cord with the home’s value makes redemption an attractive (or at least plausi-
ble) investment for financers.  In 2018, the average mortgage combined loan-to-
value (CLTV) at origination was 86% (if the average house cost $100,000, the 
borrower would pay a $14,000 down payment and borrow the remaining 
86%).93 Even for borrowers in the 90th percentile for FICO score, some of the 
most traditionally creditworthy borrowers, the typical CLTV was 97%.94 Lend-
ers simply do not lend more than what the collateral is worth.  Thus, reducing 
the refinancing payment to accord with the home’s value via redemption creates 
the opportunity for a transaction.
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/woman-charged-after-dead-animals-found-foreclosed-
lawrenceville-home/dmmEO7SWQ6AThjK6PSyMVM/#.
89. U.C.C. § 9-623 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N. 2010).
90. See Daniel Bortz, The Real Estate Commission: A Guide to Who Pays, How Much, and 
More, https://www.realtor.com/advice/sell/real-estate-commission-explained/ (Apr. 15, 2019); Red-
Fin, How Real Estate Commission Works, https://www.redfin.com/resources/how-much-is-real-
estate-agent-commission-buyer-seller (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
91. See Hollar, supra note 88, at 187.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (4), (5) (2020).
93. HOUS. FIN. POL’Y CTR., HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE: A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK, at 
17 (Oct. 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99256/october_chartbook_
2018_0.pdf.
94. Id.
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Under the current system, bankruptcy is a pit stop on the way to an eventual 
sale and eviction of the debtor.  Assuming a niche market for home redemption 
financing emerges like it has for personal property redemption, the debtor will 
have access to the requisite funds, effectively refinancing their mortgage at the 
actual value of the home and reducing their monthly obligation accordingly.95
In the end, the secured creditor is better off. It has received the value of its al-
lowed secured claim without absorbing the cost and delay of foreclosure and 
resale.
2. Economic and Social Benefits for the Debtor and Society
The biggest benefit to the debtor under the proposed change is that she can 
remain in her home.  This benefit cannot be overstated.  Depending on where a 
given year falls in the economic cycle, between 625,000 and 2.87 million fore-
closure proceedings occur each year.96 A substantial portion of this displaced 
population experiences some form of homelessness, with untold others making 
do in partial or temporary accommodations (e.g., sleeping on a friend’s couch, 
placing children in friends’ homes).  According to a 2009 report by the National 
Coalition for the Homeless, at least 1 in 10 homeless people had lost their 
homes to foreclosure.97 Keeping debtors in their homes prevents the harms of 
foreclosure and homelessness, which aligns with the core normative and policy 
judgments underpinning the bankruptcy system and gives further substance to 
the debtor’s “fresh start.” The “fresh start” is important along three related di-
mensions: (1) it rehabilitates the debtor, turning them into a productive member 
of the economy, (2) it minimizes negative health, economic, and educational 
externalities, and (3) it reflects a normative judgment about societal forgiveness.
Individuals that declare bankruptcy are already at a financial disadvantage 
compared to their peers.  In the short term, these economic pains are felt in a 
variety of ways, as debtors incur moving, administrative, and legal costs.98 Ad-
justed for inflation to 2010 dollars, the average cost to homeowners of foreclo-
sure can be over $10,000.99 In the medium and long term, additional losses 
95. See supra Part II(b) note 69.
96. See ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Drops to 13-Year Low in 2018
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.attomdata.com/news/most-recent/2018-year-end-foreclosure-market-
report/.
97. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 5 (2009), https://www.nationalhomeless.org
/advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness0609.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-
Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com
/2009/10/19/business/economy/19foreclosed.html. See also HOUS. FIN. POL’Y CTR, supra note 93,
at 9.
98. See Hollar, supra note 88, at 187.
99. See id. (citing ANA MORENO, COST EFFECTIVENESS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
PREVENTION 19–20 (1995)) (studying the outcomes of over 800 low- and moderate-income dis-
tressed homeowners who were assisted by the Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Program in Minne-
apolis & St. Paul, Minnesota between 1991–1995). A portion of this loss may reflect accrued equity, 
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make themselves apparent.  For example, without a mortgage, the debtor re-
ceives less favorable tax treatment that can cost thousands of dollars per year.100
Those who file for bankruptcy continue to experience debt payment difficulties 
and accumulate less wealth relative to comparative nonfilers.101
Homelessness, caused by foreclosure, exacerbates these struggles.  Those 
experiencing homelessness face substantial hurdles to finding and maintaining 
employment, including bias from potential employers and the effects of trau-
ma.102 Emerging from bankruptcy, a newly discharged debtor without a home 
is financially unstable and faces diminished future wealth accumulation pro-
spects.
In addition to individual economic benefits, preventing foreclosure and 
homelessness have large public economic benefits as well.  Foreclosures fol-
lowed by long-term vacancies harms neighboring property values by reducing 
the physical appearance of the neighborhood, attracting crime, and depressing 
the local economy.103 Pre-financial crisis studies estimated the costs of a single 
foreclosure on neighboring properties to be a decline in value of $1,508.104
These value drops compound as the stigma of a foreclosed property in the 
neighborhood prompts other homeowners to lower their sales prices or make 
their homes available for sale in anticipation of decreased neighborhood quali-
ty.105
If the debtors are made homeless as a result of foreclosure, additional social 
costs come into play.  As explained below, homeless populations have an in-
creased risk of exposure to communicable diseases and, without adequate health 
insurance or non-profit healthcare, homeless populations must use publicly 
funded emergency rooms.106 Further, state and municipal “interactions” (e.g., 
treatment, police, sanitation) with the homeless strain budgets. For example, in 
a single year, Los Angeles spent tens of millions of dollars interacting with the 
homeless.107 By allowing the debtor the opportunity to redeem her homestead, 
which would not be present in the case of an underwater home, reducing the cost figure in these 
instances.
100. See, e.g., Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: What are the tax benefits of homeowner-
ship?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-tax-benefits-
homeownership.
101. See generally Song Han & Geng Li, Household Borrowing after Personal Bankruptcy,
43 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 491 (2011).
102. Overcoming Employment Barriers, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS (Aug. 21, 
2013), https://endhomelessness.org/resource/overcoming-employment-barriers/.
103. Hollar, supra note 88.
104. Id. (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Im-
pact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57 
(2006)).
105. Id.
106. See The Impact of Homelessness on Economic Competitiveness, AM. SEC.
PROJECT (May 1, 2018), https://www.americansecurityproject.org/impact-homelessness-economic-
competitiveness/.
107. See id.
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the Code could prevent the additional economic harms of foreclosure and home-
lessness without prejudicing the creditor’s rights.
Continuing, homelessness also contributes to poor health outcomes. Home-
less populations are more susceptible to communicable diseases, such as hepati-
tis, and suffer from reduced access to medical care services in general. 108
“Chronic health problems and inaccessibility to medical and dental care can in-
crease school absences and limit employment opportunities . . . . People with-
out homes have higher rates of hospitalizations for physical illnesses, mental 
illness and substance abuse than other populations.”109 By preventing foreclo-
sure-induced homelessness at the outset, my proposed statutory change would 
shield bankrupt debtors from these negative health effects.
The negative externalities of foreclosure-induced homelessness are not lim-
ited to the individual filer or debtor but also extend to their families.  Unsurpris-
ingly, experiencing homelessness has a negative impact on a child’s educational 
outcomes.110 This added instability results in a 14% lower high school gradua-
tion rate compared to other low-income students and 20% compared to the 
84.1% national average.111 This gap affects the child’s job opportunities and 
economic circumstances throughout the rest of the child’s working life.112 Re-
demption during bankruptcy would neutralize these harms at their source, pre-
venting childhood eviction and the attendant negative externalities.
Last, allowing the debtor to redeem her home expresses the social norms of 
forgiveness and responsibility embodied in the Code.  As discussed above in 
Part I, the bankruptcy system has deep roots in American culture and embodies 
American values.  The robust discharge—more powerful than in other jurisdic-
tions around the world113—stands in stark contrast to the debtor’s prisons of the 
past. Allowing home redemption balances the desire to forgive against the 
equally powerful desire to ensure people repay their obligations.  The debtor 
gets a second chance under more favorable circumstances, not complete relief.
108. Id.
109. Health and Homelessness, AM PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N (2011), https://www.apa.org
/pi/ses/resources/publications/homelessness-health.
110. See Stephanie Dickrell, Child Homelessness Can Have Long-Term Consequences, SC
TIMES (June 4, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.sctimes.com/story/news/local/homelesskids
/2016/06/04/child-homelessness-can-have-long-term-consequences/84902750/.
111. See Mark Keierleber, 1.3 Million Homeless Students: New Federal Data Show a 70 Per-
cent Jump in K-12 Homelessness Over Past Decade, with Big Implications for Academic Perfor-
mance, THE 74 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.the74million.org/1-3-million-homeless-students-new-
federal-data-show-a-70-percent-jump-in-k-12-homelessness-over-past-decade-with-big-
implications-for-academic-performance/.
112. See Clive R. Belfield, The Economic Burden of High School Dropouts and School Sus-
pensions in Florida, CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, at 1 (Nov. 2014) (“Over their lifetimes, these dropouts 
will have lower incomes, contribute less in taxes, rely more heavily on government health and wel-
fare programs, and impose higher costs on the criminal justice system.”).
113. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 39, at 319.
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In short, keeping a debtor in her home through and after bankruptcy pre-
vents a potential parade of economic, health, and educational horrors that could 
afflict her, her family, and society for years to come.  Even more, my proposed 
change upholds the bankruptcy system’s core mission—to appropriately bal-
ance the rights of debtors and creditors—by benefitting both parties.
C. Counterarguments
As with any proposed statutory change, extending the right of redemption to 
real property in bankruptcy faces challenges to its enactment and risks of its 
adoption.  In particular, the proposed change must combat concerns about op-
portunistic debtors taking advantage of cyclicality in the real estate market, po-
litical opposition to debtor-friendly legislative changes, judicial implementation, 
and market development.  Fortunately, solutions for these concerns can already 
be found in the Code, our political process, and our jurisprudence.
1. The “Abusive Debtor” Risk
The primary argument against adopting this change follows much of the an-
ti-debtor discourse that animated BAPCPA’s passage in 2005.  Proponents of 
the bill argued that the bankruptcy system and its powerful discharge was being 
abused by debtors who did not need to file bankruptcy, but rather opportunisti-
cally chose to do so.114 Extending the right of redemption to real property is 
subject to criticism from the same animating concern.  Most personal property 
that a person could redeem, such as a car, depreciates over time, removing any 
concern that the debtor would receive a windfall upon post-discharge asset ap-
preciation.  However, because real estate is a cyclical market, it is possible that 
a redeemed home will later appreciate, accruing a benefit to the debtor while the 
lender’s claim will be unfairly reduced.  An opportunistic (or lucky) debtor 
could declare bankruptcy during a market trough when the home is worth its 
least, redeem the property, and recalibrate her debt at that lower level, thereby 
reaping the benefit of the rising market at the mortgage lender’s expense.
While the “opportunistic debtor” conjures up a vivid picture of abuse, this 
characterization does not reflect reality.  Consumer debtors are loath to file 
bankruptcy because of social stigma against bankruptcy. As discussed above, 
the moral treatment of obligation and debt has deep roots in Western tradition.  
Even today, with heightened recognition that economic and social forces out-
side a debtor’s control can wreak havoc on her financial security, many Ameri-
cans still attribute fault to the individual—enough that filers overwhelmingly 
feel stigma.115 This idea of individual responsibility is “based on a presumption 
114. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 24.
115. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Less Stigma or More 
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 213, 236–39 (2006); Nicola Howell & Rosalind F. Mason, Reinforcing Stigma or 
Delivering a Fresh Start: Bankruptcy and Future Engagement in the Workforce, 38 UNIV. OF NEW
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of fundamental autonomy and individual agency that not only runs through the 
Bankruptcy Code . . . but also through the American legal system as a 
whole.”116 Coupled with the fact that most debtors file bankruptcy as a result of 
health, marital, or economic trauma,117 a countervailing and more accurate pic-
ture of the typical debtor emerges: a debtor that files as a last resort because she 
knows society will view her as a financial failure no matter what.  This reluc-
tancy suggests that debtors will not flock to bankruptcy simply to redeem their 
real property when they think the market is low.
Finally, the “‘overfiling’ as a proxy for abuse” criticism is not supported by 
data.  Though critics point to a rising number of bankruptcy filings as evidence 
of declining stigma, 118 increased filings follow broader economic trends and 
credit default rates,119 suggesting the picture is not so clear.
To the extent that redemption of real property actually incentivizes the mar-
ginal debtor to file a bankruptcy proceeding that they otherwise would not, the 
aberration should not define the rule.  As it stands, the Code already tolerates a 
certain amount of debtor opportunism and manipulation.  This is the tradeoff of 
a debt-discharge system.  First, the Code allows a debtor to choose whether she 
wants to use the exemptions afforded to her under state law or the federal ex-
emptions provided in the Code.120 Here, the Code specifically permits the debt-
or to choose the exemptions that allow her to shield more of her assets from 
creditors.  That the Code already entrusts bankruptcy judges with discretion to 
detect and punish abuse throughout the debtor’s proceeding, including her ini-
tial chapter choice,121 demonstrates a legislative willingness for ad hoc policing.  
This judicial determination of bad faith could be used as a tool to guard against 
those marginal, egregious abuses while allowing the good faith majority of fil-
ers to benefit from my statutory change.
2. Political Opposition & Lawmaking Process
As with any statutory change, extending the right of redemption to real 
property faces the challenges inherent in the political and lawmaking processes.  
SOUTH WALES L. J. 1529, 1530–31 (2015); Leon Anderson & Deborah J. Thorne, Managing the 
Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 83 (2006).
116. See Yvana L.B.H. Mols, Comment, Bankruptcy Stigma and Vulnerability: Questioning 
Autonomy and Structuring Resilience, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 290–91 (2012).
117. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 39.
118. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV.
177, 210, 215–22 (1999).
119. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or 
More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Fil-
ings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 236–39 (2006); see also Nicola Howell & Rosalind Mason, Reinforcing 
Stigma or Delivering a Fresh Start: Bankruptcy and Future Engagement in the Workforce, 38 UNIV 
OF NEW S. WALES L. J. 1529, 1530–31 (2015).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
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Passing substantive legislative change is difficult, especially in today’s frac-
tured political environment.122 Even more, because the Code reflects and em-
bodies charged moral and policy values, small changes can be magnified.  Con-
gress’ recent aversion to helping debtors is embodied in BAPCPA’s passage in 
2005.  Down to the very name—”Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention”—BAPCPA 
presumed unscrupulous filers and made it harder for debtors to file Chapter 7, 
removing much of their agency.  When the most recent substantive bankruptcy 
legislation conceived of debtors as abusers, any pro-debtor change is subject to 
scrutiny, even if it does not prejudice the creditor.
However, the world in 2005 was different than the world today.  In 2005, 
the housing market was in the middle of an unprecedented boom.123 Though 
wages were stagnant and the cost of living rising, easy credit and rising home 
values disguised the financial precariousness of many American families. 124
This veneer of prosperity made it easy to believe that those who did not prosper 
were partially responsible or even blameworthy.  This misconception of why 
people file bankruptcy fed the argument that the bankruptcy system was being 
abused.  In 2007, the global financial markets crashed, sending the United 
States into the Great Recession.125 The failure of the U.S. housing market pre-
cipitated this collapse.126 In its wake, substantial financial reforms have been 
passed to protect consumers, including Dodd-Frank and its creation of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).127 Though these changes still face 
powerful opposition,128 their enactment represents pro-consumer legislative de-
122. Cf. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bills/statistics (showing fewer passed resolutions and enacted laws than in any other period present-
ed).
123. See Les Christie, Real Estate: Busts Don’t Follow Booms, CNN Money (May 4, 2005, 
3:29 PM) https://money.cnn.com/2005/05/03/real_estate/financing/boom_bust/index.htm (“The 
number of U.S. metropolitan areas experiencing booms in real estate prices spiked 72 percent in 
2004, according to a report from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).”).
124. See How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago? INVESTOPEDIA
(Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-does-current-cost-living-
compare-20-years-ago.asp; see also Kelsey Ramíirez, Mortgage Credit Availability Reaches Post-
Crisis High Among GSEs, Government Lenders, HOUSING WIRE (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:01 PM) 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47227-mortgage-credit-availability-reaches-post-crisis-high-
among-gses-government-lenders/; see also Jean Folger, Financial Crisis + 10: Where Are Home 
Prices Now?, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/financial-
crisis-10-where-are-home-prices-now/.
125. Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709.
126. Kimberley Amadeo, 2007 Financial Crisis Explanation, Causes, and Timeline,
BALANCE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/2007-financial-crisis-overview-3306138.
127. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
128. See Aaron Klein, No, Dodd-Frank Was Neither Repealed Nor Gutted. Here’s What Real-
ly Happened, BROOKINGS (May 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/no-dodd-frank-was-
neither-repealed-nor-gutted-heres-what-really-happened/; see also Kelsey Ramíirez, Payday Lender 
Challenges CFPB Constitutionality in Supreme Court Petition, HOUSING WIRE (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:37 
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velopments since BAPCPA’s passage.  Today, the populist rhetoric of presiden-
tial candidates proves the popularity of anti-establishment impulses, both in the 
financial system and beyond.129
3. Judicial Implementation
Critics may challenge the notion that bankruptcy judges can accurately de-
termine value and instead propose that the auction and sale foreclosure process 
is a better measure, but bankruptcy judges are well-equipped to execute this 
change.  The Code already empowers bankruptcy judges to determine value in 
several areas, including the value of the secured lender’s allowed secured claim, 
which definitionally includes a valuation of the collateral.130 In addition, as dis-
cussed above, judges are already empowered to penalize abusive filers with 
dismissal or denial of discharge when necessary.  Lastly, statutory restrictions 
on repeat filing allay concerns that debtors will quickly refile if they face fore-
closure proceedings again.131
4. Market Development
Perhaps the most daunting obstacle facing my proposed change is that its 
success is predicated on the development of a functional home redemption fi-
nancing market.  However, a functioning home redemption financing market is 
likely to develop.  First, the very existence of the personal property redemption 
financing industry suggests that lenders do not automatically disqualify recently 
bankrupt debtors.  In addition, anecdotal evidence of recent filers receiving 
credit card offers via the mail also suggests that the belief in the creditworthi-
ness of recently bankrupt debtors is less idiosyncratic and more broadly accept-
ed.  Indeed, some lenders offer and advertise financial products specifically de-
signed for debtors who recently went through bankruptcy.132
PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/payday-lender-challenges-cfpb-constitutionality-in-
supreme-court-petition/.
129. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Expert Efficiency of Elizabeth Warren’s Populist 
Campaign, NEW YORKER (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-
scene/what-kind-of-populist-is-elizabeth-warren; see also John Cassidy, Bernie Sanders and the 
New Populism, NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy
/bernie-sanders-and-the-new-populism; Charles Postel, If Trump and Sanders Are Both Populists, 
What Does Populist Mean?, ORG. OF AM. HISTORIANS (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.oah.org/tah
/issues/2016/february/if-trump-and-sanders-are-both-populists-what-does-populist-mean/.
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
131. See Repeat Filings, JUSTIA (Nov. 2018), https://www.justia.com/bankruptcy/repeat-
filings/ (discussing restrictions on refiling bankruptcy).
132. See Song Han et al., Information, Contract Design, and Unsecured Credit Supply: Evi-
dence from Credit Card Mailings, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-103 (describing how 
lenders tailor advertising and financial products around a borrower’s bankruptcy); see, e.g., Fresh 
Start Loan, FREESTAR FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION, https://www.freestarfinancial.com/fresh-start-
loan (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) (advertising “Fresh Start Loans” to help recently bankrupt borrow-
ers “re-establish [their] credit”); Brandon A. Dorfman, Bankruptcy Promised Me a Fresh Start. 
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Homes also have an entirely different loan collateral profile than do cars, 
and the lending markets differ in material ways.  All cars depreciate, no matter 
what, all the time.  While this may not apply to “classic” or other cars bought 
for investment purposes, such cars are not common or widespread enough to 
merit extended discussion.  As a result, as soon as the auto lender issues funds, 
the value of their collateral decreases.  Home values, as noted above, are more 
cyclical.  The prospect that the collateral will appreciate, which animates those 
obsessed with the “abusive debtor,” is a tally in favor of the creditworthiness of 
the loan.  If the home appreciates, the lender’s collateral coverage improves au-
tomatically.  These differences can cut against real property redemption as well: 
larger loan sizes make diversification more difficult for lenders, longer repay-
ment terms increase exposure to risk of default, and heavier regulation increases 
compliance costs.133 Perhaps most salient are the differences related to foreclo-
sure—repossession of cars is far cheaper and faster than repossession of 
homes.134
While little information is publicly available on redemption financers’ ap-
proval rates, required loan-to-value ratios, or other underwriting criteria, down 
payment requirements make redemption financing more attractive to the lender.  
Though required down payments reduce the number of people who are able to 
redeem their homes by raising a threshold obstacle, they build an equity cushion 
into the redeemed home’s new capital structure, benefitting the lender.  For 
debtors able to clear this hurdle, the price of staying in their home would drop 
substantially.135
Finally, few Chapter 7 debtors actually elect to redeem their cars.136 While 
detailed information is not available on the reasons, this phenomenon is partial-
ly explained by the down payment hurdle, the debtor’s lack of effective coun-
Predatory Lenders Are Trying to Ruin It, Talk Poverty (Dec. 10, 2019), https://talkpoverty.org
/2019/12/10/bankruptcy-debt-predatory-lenders/ (describing how the author, a recent bankruptcy 
filer and recipient of a discharge, receives roughly “10 credit card offers per month, not including 
solicitations for auto loans, payday loans, and mortgage refinances”).
133. Compare CHERYL R. COOPER, CONG. RSCH SERV, IF 11192, THE AUTOMOBILE 
LENDING MARKET AND POLICY ISSUES (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11192.pdf (noting that 
auto lenders are subject to regulation by the CFPB and must comply with other fair lending legisla-
tion like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act) with CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES 
WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44918.pdf (highlighting the regulators covering bank and non-bank 
mortgage originators and purchasers, including the CFPB, Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy (OCC), FDIC, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)).
134. Home foreclosure incurs the time, maintenance, tax and other costs. See supra Part 
III(b)(i). Repossessing a car, on the other hand, only requires finding a vendor with a tow truck or 
activating a pre-installed remote “kill switch”. See, e.g., Elaine S. Povich, Late Payment? A ‘Kill 
Switch’ Can Strand You and Your Car, STATELINE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en
/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/11/27/late-payment-a-kill-switch-can-strand-you-and-
your-car.
135. See supra Part II(b); see also supra Part II(b) note 69.
136. Pamela Foohey et al., Driven to Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 23) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3451565).
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selling or information about redemption’s availability, and the superficial attrac-
tiveness of ride through or reaffirmation.  Whatever the reason, this suggests 
that the structures preventing debtors from redeeming their cars may similarly 
prevent debtors in a potential home redemption market. To the extent this phe-
nomenon is due to ineffective information or counselling of consumers, those 
problems exist elsewhere in the legal system and are not solved by forgoing 
progressive incremental change simply because it may not be widely used.  In-
asmuch as low redemption rates are attributable to market conditions, those 
conditions should not defeat a cheap and straightforward change that will im-
prove the lives of the consumer debtors who can use it.
CONCLUSION
The simple statutory change outlined in this Note would extend the well-
trodden right of redemption to real property in bankruptcy, effectively allowing 
the debtor to refinance her mortgage to reflect the actual value of her home.  By 
empowering debtors to remain in their homes, extending the right to redeem to 
real property in Chapter 7 bankruptcy would protect debtors from homelessness 
and its negative economic, health, and educational outcomes.  Though critics 
may allege real property is not appropriate for redemption in bankruptcy, these 
criticisms are misguided.  Admittedly, this change will not keep every debtor in 
her home, but the Bankruptcy Code is littered with tradeoffs.  For the families it 
would help, real property redemption may make all the difference.
